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THE FRUITS OF MISCHIEVOUS SEEDS: NOTICE
FILING UNDER ARTICLE 9 AND THE
CONTINUING PROBLEM OF TRADE NAMES
Jeffrey W. Morris*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Earl T. Brushwood was appointed the trustee in bankruptcy of
Glasco, Inc.' Upon his appointment, Brushwood attempted to ascertain
the debtor's financial position, and inquired of the secretary of state of
Florida as to whether any article 9 financing statements' were on file
under "Glasco, Inc." A filing clerk in the secretary of state's office
searched the file and reported to Brushwood that no such statements
appeared.4 In fact, however, there was a financing statement on record
with the secretary which purported to cover marine engines in the
debtor's inventory.8 The financing statement, however, was filed and
indexed under "Elite Boats, Division of Glasco, Inc." and, therefore,
was not found.6
The trustee, apparently having determined that no financing statements were recorded to perfect any security interests in the debtor's
property, sold the marine engines pursuant to his duty under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 The Citizens Bank of Perry, however, claimed the proceeds of the sale, asserting that the financing statement described
above, which it had filed with the secretary of state, was sufficient to
perfect its interest in the marine engines.8 Both the bankruptcy court
and the district court disagreed with the bank and instead found that
the security interest was unperfected because the financing statement
was filed under a name other than the debtor's corporate name. 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Brushwood v.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Providence College
(1974); J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law (1977).
I. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1972) (governing when a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest).
3. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 795.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee, inter alia, to "collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate . . . as expeditiously as is compatible with the best
interests of parties in interest .
I I U.S.C. § 704(1) (1982).
8. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 795.
9. Id.
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Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.),' 0 reversed the lower courts and held

that the financing statement was not seriously misleading and thus was
sufficient to perfect the bank's security interest in the marine engines."
The decision invoked a prophetic dissent. Judge Elbert Tuttle
noted: "The majority eschews technicality to reach what might be considered to be a common sense solution in finding a perfected security
interest despite an irregularity in the filing. Because this superficially
appealing result contains the seeds for future mischief I cannot concur." 12 The seeds of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Glasco have taken
root. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit itself has nurtured the rule of Glasco
to the point where it threatens to become a generally accepted rule for
determining whether a financing statement is sufficient to perfect an
article 9 security interest when the statement is filed and indexed solely
under the debtor's trade name. 8
This article will address the issues raised by the decision in Glasco
in light of the specific language of the applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). In addition, it will consider
the effects of the decision on later cases facing the same problem. Finally, this article will propose an analytical framework for the courts to
employ in determining whether a financing statement filed under a
name other than the debtor's legal name can perfect the creditor's security interest.
I.
A.

THE ARTICLE 9 NOTICE FILING SYSTEM

The 1972 Official Text

Article 9 of the U.C.C. provides three separate ways for creditors
to perfect their security interests in debtors' property. The creditor may
take possession of the property,' the interest may be perfected automatically,' 8 or the creditor may file a financing statement.' In the vast
majority of cases, the last alternative is the only or preferred method of
perfecting the security interest. 7
10. 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981). The decision was rendered prior to the creation of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The case arose in Florida and was governed by Florida law to the extent permitted by the Bankruptcy Code. See generally Countryman,
The Use of State Law inBankruptcy Cases (pts. I & 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 631 (1972).
11. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
12. Id. at 797 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g.. National Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
14. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1972). This article will focus exclusively on the 1972 Official Text.
15. Id. §§ 9-302(l)(d)-(e), 9-304(4)-(5).
16. Id. § 9-302.
17. Security interests in accounts and general intangibles can be perfected only by filing a
financing statement. Id. §§ 9-302, 9-305. However, there is a limited instance of automatic perfec-
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Section 9-402(1) itemizes the requirements for a valid financing
statement. 18 The statement must include the names of both the debtor

and the creditor, a mailing address for the debtor and an address for
the secured party, a satisfactory description of the collateral covered by
the statement, and the debtor's signature.19 The creditor then must file
the statement in an appropriate public office pursuant to the local variation of U.C.C. section 9-401.10 Upon filing," the Code directs the
clerk to mark the statement with a number and index it under the
debtor's name.a2 Thereafter, any interested third party can obtain in-

formation regarding security interests that may exist with respect to
the collateral described in the filed financing statements." The searcher
determines through the indexing system whether a particular debtor's
name appears and then reviews any financing statement identified by
number in the index as connected to that debtor.2 4 Thus, the article 9
public-notice system rises and falls on the integrity of the debtor-name
index that the clerk must maintain.25 It is the index, after all, that file
searchers use to determine whether any financing statements of interest
have been put to record. Therefore, the information contained in the

index, primarily the debtor's name, is arguably more important than
the additional information included on the face of the financing statement itself. The reason for this, quite simply, is that if the index inaccurately describes the debtor, the file searcher may never find the related financing statement to review its contents. Thus, if the index does
not lead the searcher to the filed financing statement, no real public
notice is effected. 2
tion of some security interests in accounts. Id. § 9-302(1)(e). Filing is the preferred method for
perfecting security interests in many other types of collateral because it allows the debtor to retain
possession of the collateral.
18. See id. § 9-402(1).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 9-401. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
21. Filing occurs upon the "[presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of
U.C.C. § 9-403(1) (1972).
the filing fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer .
22. Id. § 9-403(4).
23. The presence of a financing statement does not necessarily mean that the creditor
named on the financing statement has a security interest in the identified collateral of the named
debtor. Section 9-402(1) provides that the financing statement may be filed prior to the time that
a security interest attaches. Id. § 9-402(1). Furthermore, the rule of priority among competing
holders of security interests encourages the filing of financing statements prior to the attachment
of security interests. See id. § 9-312(5). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 25-4 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing priorities

under § 9-312(5)) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
24. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1972).
25. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re Tyler), 23 Bankr.
806, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
26. Self, Secured Transactions Under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code: A Call for
Procedural Notice, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. I11, 123 (1985).
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In addition to the indexing system, there is another provision in
part 4 of article 9 which is of paramount importance to the operation of
the notice filing system. File searchers must not only know the debtor's
name to search through the index, but they also must know the appropriate office in which to search for the debtor's name."7 Thus, the file
searcher must know not only the debtor's name, but may also be required to know the debtor's business location or residence, and other
matters in order to search the appropriate record in the appropriate
office.2 8
Section 9-401 of the U.C.C. contains the Code's location of filing
rules. 9 Unfortunately, the "uniform" Code section promulgated by the
drafters encourages diverse filing location rules.3 0 The drafters recognized that "local considerations and policy will determine the choice [of
filing location] to be made.""1 Consequently, enacting jurisdictions are
permitted to overlook the Code's general policy "to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions." 32 Furthermore, a number of
states have opted entirely out of the alternative filing location rules
contained in section 9-401(1) creating significantly different requirements for the location of financing statement filings under article 9.33 It
is beyond the scope of this article to address all of the difficulties raised
by the myriad of location filing rules; nevertheless, the Code's somewhat forgiving attitude concerning failures to file financing statements
in the proper location34 provides some support for this article's proposed treatment of financing statements filed in the proper place but
under a trade name. As such, it is appropriate to briefly outline those
provisions.
The Code's general filing location rules provide for three alternatives: a statewide or centralized filing system, 86 a county by county or

27. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972).
28. See id. The location of the filing will depend on these additional factors. See also infra
notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
29. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1972). The Official Text of § 9-401(l) provides three alternative
filing systems. See id. See also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. Moreover, a number of
states have adopted nonuniform filing provisions that differ from the alternatives provided in the
Official Text of the U.C.C. See generally U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972), 3A U.L.A. 6, 14-24 (1981)
(listing variations of adopting jurisdictions); id., 3A U.L.A. 3, 3-6 (Supp. 1986) (listing variations
of adopting jurisdictions).
30. See supra note 29 & infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
31. U.C.C. § 9-401 comment 1 (1972).
32. Id. § 1-102(2)(c).
33. See supra note 29.
34. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972) ("A filing which is made in good faith in an improper
place . . is nevertheless effective . . against any person who has knowledge of the contents of

such financing statement."). See also infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
35. U.C.C. § 9-401(l)(b) (1972) (first alternative subsection (1)).
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localized filing system," a or a dual filing system which requires filing
both locally and in a centralized system.3 7 Failure to file in the appropriate place or places designated in the particular jurisdiction's section
9-401(1) will render the creditor's security interest unperfected if filing
is required for perfection. 3 8 The Code, however, contains a savings provision which deems locationally incorrect filings effective for a limited
purpose. 3 ' Section 9-401(2) provides that improper filings are "effective
with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against
any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement.' 0 Thus, even though a creditor files the financing statement in
the wrong office, the security interest still may be deemed perfected in
a priority conflict with another party who has actual knowledge of the
contents of the financing statement.4 1 Accordingly, the Code seems to
embrace a significant exception to the otherwise strict filing requirements in part 4 of article 9. The savings provision effectively replaces
the Code's location filing rules whenever the party asserting an interest
in the collateral has knowledge of the contents of the financing statement even though the statement was not filed in the appropriate
place." This "relaxation" of the perfection rules can be construed as
evidencing a willingness by the drafters of the Code to subordinate the
importance of the notice filing system whenever actual notice was effected in a particular circumstance. Nevertheless, other provisions of
the Code suggest that the drafters did not intend to adopt any generalized rule that would subjugate the notice-filing system in the face of
an interested party's actual knowledge.' 3 For the remainder of this article, it will be assumed that the creditor has filed the financing statement in the appropriate filing office unless otherwise stated.
Throughout its history, article 9 has required financing statements
to include the name of the debtor as a condition of perfection." In

36. Id. § 9-401(1)(a) (second alternative subsection (1)).
37. Id. § 9-401(1)(c) (third alternative subsection (I)).
38. See id. § 9-401(1) (first, second, and third alternative subsection (1)) ("The proper
place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows ....").See, e.g., In re Kalinoski,
13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 387 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (security interest remained unperfected
when creditor mistakenly filed at wrong location).
39. U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972).
40. Id. See, e.g., McKesson Drug Co. v. Marcus (In re Mistura, Inc.), 705 F.2d 1496 (9th
Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
41. See Mistura, 705 F.2d at 1498-99.
42. The location filing rule is supplanted only as to the second party who has actual knowledge of the contents of the improperly filed financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972).
The filing remains improper and ineffective against any party who does not have actual knowledge
of the contents of the financing statement. See id.
43. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
44. Section 9-402(1) has always enumerated the requirements for financing statements. See
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earlier editions, this requirement was implicit in the provision enumerating the requisites of financing statements" and there was no provision in the Code addressing the proper manner of including a debtor's
name in the financing statement. The 1972 Official Text, however, specifically addresses the issue and requires that the financing statement
give the name of the debtor."' Furthermore, the 1972 Code also contains a provision that enumerates the proper way to "name" the debtor
in the financing statement. 47 Section 9-402(7) provides, in part, that
"[a] financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it
gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor,
whether or not it adds other trade names or names of partners."' 8 The
Code contains no additional directive regarding the manner of naming
a debtor in a financing statement. The official comments to section 9402, however, attempt to shed some light on the appropriate interpretation of that section. 49 Specifically, comment 7 states that the financing
statement for individual debtors should be filed only in the individual's
name and not under a trade name.50 The same is true of a filing for a
partnership or corporation.5 1 The comment notes: "[Tirade names are
deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the secured party or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system.'
The Code does provide elsewhere that a secured party
may include a debtor's trade name and may have that trade name
added to the index by the filing officer.8 3 Comment 7, however, strongly
suggests that filing solely under a trade name is insufficient to meet the
requirements of section 9-402(1)."

U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). The Official Texts promulgated in 1952, 1957, 1958, and 1962 each
required that the financing statement be signed by the debtor but did not otherwise require that
the debtor's name appear on the statement. See id. § 9-402(1) (1952, 1957, 1958 & 1962). The
Official Texts also required the clerk to maintain an index of the statements according to the
debtor's name. Id. § 9-403(4). The 1952 Official Text of § 9-403(4) also required the clerk to
index the statements according to the secured party's name. Id. § 9-403(4) (1952). However, this
dual indexing requirement was not carried through to the 1972 Official Text. See id. § 9-403
(1972) ("[T]he filing officer shall index the statement according to the name of the debtor and
shall note in the index the file number and the address of the debtor given in the statement.").
45. See, e.g., McMillin v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799
(W.D. Okla. 1975). See generally 9 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9402:16 (1985).
46. U.C.C. § 9-402(1), (7) (1972).
47. Id. § 9-402(7).
48. Id.
49. See id. § 9-402 comments 7-9.
50. Id. § 9-402 comment 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. § 9-403(5).
54. See id. § 9-402 comment 7 See also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, section 9-402(7) does not preclude the perfection of security interests by filing a financing statement identifying the debtor by
a trade name." That section simply provides that a filing in the legal
name of the debtor is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a financing statement contained in section 9-402(1).11 It does not, however,
specifically provide that filing of the trade name is not sufficient to satisfy section 9-402(1).67 Nonetheless, the strong language of comment 7
and the logical consistency between the Code and that comment suggest that the argument that trade name filings may be sufficient is inappropriate. Furthermore, there is evidence that the addition of section
9-402(7) to the Code in 1972 was not intended to enhance the likelihood that financing statements setting out only the debtor's trade name
would be sufficient to perfect the claimed security interest." Consequently, although the 1972 version of section 9-402(7) could permit a
court to consider trade name financing statements sufficient, more persuasive arguments should lead to a rejection of this theory.
The courts need not look much beyond section 9-402(7), however,
to find statutory support for permitting trade name financing statements to perfect security interests. Section 9-402(8) provides: "A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of
this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are
not seriously misleading." 5 ' Thus, if a financing statement identifies a
debtor only through his trade name, a court could consider the statement effective if the failure to include the debtor's legal name is a minor error which is not seriously misleading.'0 A number of courts have
adopted this analysis."
B. Codifications Prior to the 1972 Official Text

The problem of defective filings is not a recent development under
the U.C.C.--similar problems existed under prior statutory schemes
that included notice-filing systems."' Nevertheless, the early Official
WIrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 23-16, at 959.
56. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972).
57. See id. See also WHITE & SUMMEitS, supra note 23, § 23-16, at 959.
58. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text. See also U.C.C. Article 9 General
Comment 1-9. 3 U.L.A. 49 (1970).
59. U.C.C. ] 9-402(8) (1972).
60. See Id.
61. See. e.g.. National Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316 (5th Cir. 1983); Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
1981); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Fedders Fin. Corp. (In re Hammons), 614 F.2d 399
(5th Cir. 1980); Records & Tapes, Inc. v. Argus, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d 255, 655 P.2d 133 (1982);
In re Nara Non Food Distrib. Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1970), af'd
mem.. 36 A.D.2d 796, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971).
62. See. e.g.. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143
55.
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Texts of the U.C.C. did not include any savings provision that protected statements containing minor errors that were not seriously misleading.68 The language in current U.C.C. section 9-402(8) was added
to the Code in the 1957 Official Text as section 9-402(5)." The same
statutory codification was contained in the 1962 Official Text.6"
The impetus for the addition of this savings provision came not
from the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C., but instead resulted from a suggestion made by the New York Law Revision Commission.6 6 The Revision Commission undertook a comprehensive study
of the 1952 Code to determine whether it should have been adopted in
New York.67 The Revision Commission study took place from 1954 to
1956 and, in its 1955 report, it noted that the then existing U.C.C.
might alter New York law.6 8 At that time, New York law required
only "a substantial compliance" with the filing provisions for "perfection" of security interests in certain personal property.6 9 The Revision
Commission noted this potential discrepancy between New York law
and a possible interpretation of the U.C.C. and, in 1956, it proposed
that "a provision be added [to section 9-402], stating that minor errors
in a financing statement, which would not mislead a reasonable person,

(1953); Bloch Bros. Paper Co. v. Efficient Direct Mail SerF.. 198 Misc. 669, 102 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1950). See generally Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing", 47 IOWA L. REV.
289 (1962); McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not Find": Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and
Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 953 (1985); Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Secured Tansactions: After-Acquired Property and Notice Filing: National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., - Mass. _.
191
N.E.2d 471 (1963), 50 CORNELL L.Q. 128, 130 n.29 (1964) (listing cases which held pre-Code
security interests unperfected because of creditor failures to meet strict, formal requirements in
filings). But cf Refrigerator Discount Corp. v. Tatelbaum (In re Nickulas), 117 F. Supp. 590 (D.
Md. 1954) (statement of trust receipts financing indexed under trade name rather than individual
proprietor's name was sufficient because it was the filing officer's duty to index the statement and
there was no evidence that any creditor was misled by the filing).
63. Section 9-402(8) of the 1972 Code was not included in the 1952 or 1956 Official Texts
of the U.C.C. See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
64. See U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1957) (amended 1972).
65. See id. § 9-402(5) (1962) (amended 1972).
66. The 1952 Official Text of the U.C.C. did not contain any savings provision in § 9-402.
See id. § 9-402(5) (1952). The earliest appearance in the U.C.C. of the savings language came in
the 1957 Official Text which was promulgated nearly two years after the New York Law Revision
Commission identified the problem and one year after the Revision Commission specifically proposed adding the provision to the Code. See id. § 9-402(5) (1957). See infra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
67. See generally STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1954).
68. 3 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1955-STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2069 (1955).
69. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/3
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do not impair its effectiveness." 7 The drafters of the U.C.C. adopted
section 9-402(5) in the 1957 Official
this proposal and 7 promulgated
1
Code.
Text of the
The Revision Commission had expressed concern that the U.C.C.
would embrace the rule adopted in General Motors Acceptance Corp.

v. Haley.72 In that case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a trust receipt filing statement which identified the trustee as
"E. R. Millen Co.," rather than by the corporation's actual name,
"E. R. Millen Co., Inc.," was insufficient under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 72 This strict reading of the requirement for a proper filing
was at odds with New York statutory law and judicial interpretations
of the New York provision.7 ' For instance, the New York statute that
rendered effective filings which were in substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law had been interpreted to protect a filing made
under the name "Efficiency Direct Mail Service, Inc.," when the
debtor's correct name was "Efficient Direct Mail Service, Inc."' 5 Furthermore, the "typographical" error contained in the debtor's name
was later corrected prior to the time any party raised an issue as to the
propriety of the filing.76 The court held that the plaintiff who asserted
that the filing was insufficient made no claim and offered no proof that
he was misled by the allegedly erroneous filing.77 In addition, the New
York court noted that the address of the debtor was correctly listed and
that "no name similar to that of the debtor existed at the debtor's address."'7 8 The court seemingly placed the burden of showing a filing to
be insufficient on the party asserting the failure of the statement to
meet the strict requirements of the statute. 79 Given this interpretation
of New York law, the Revision Commission recommended that any
New York adoption of the U.C.C. include a provision similar to the
savings provision. Ultimately, the savings provision was included in the

70. STATE OF NEW YORK. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956-REPORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 481 (1956).
71.

U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1957).

72.

329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1953). See 3 STATE OF NEW

LAW REVISION COMMISSION

(1955).
73.

FOR 1955-STuDY

YORK, REPORT OF THE
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2069

Haley, 329 Mass. at 565-66, 109 N.E.2d at 147.

See 3 STATE OF NEW YORK. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1955-STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2069 (1955).
75. Bloch Bros., 198 Misc. at 670-71, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §
74.

45 (McKinney 1954) (repealed 1964) (this section is now covered by article 9 of the U.C.C.).
76. Bloch Bros., 198 Misc. at 671. 102 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
77. Id. at 672, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
78. Id.
79. See Id. at 671, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
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1957 Official Text of the Code.80
The Code drafters' acceptance of the New York Law Revision
Commission's proposed addition to section 9-402 could arguably be
construed as an acceptance of not only the addition of the statutory
language, but also of the interpretation of the provision which placed
the burden of persuasion regarding the sufficiency of a financing statement on the party claiming that the statement did not meet the statutory prerequisites for effectiveness. Other provisions of the Code, however, indicate that it would be inappropriate to construe the Code
drafters' acceptance of the statutory revision as an acceptance of the
New York judicial interpretation of a similar provision. Specifically,
when section 9-402(5) was added to the Code, section 9-312(5) provided that when two secured creditors perfect security interests by filing financing statements, the first to file an effective financing statement has priority."1 This rule, which still exists, applies regardless of
either secured party's knowledge of the existence of the other party's
claim. Section 9-312(5) suggests that each party has the burden of
proving the effectiveness of their own filing in order to establish their
priority position under that section. This conflicts with the pre-Code
interpretation given by the New York courts to the New York statute
that required only substantial compliance with the filing provision for
the filed notice to be effective. Therefore, section 9-402(8), which comprises the 1957 version of section 9-402(5), should not be considered as
shifting the burden of proving the sufficiency of the financing statement
to anyone other than the creditor who is relying on the financing statement for perfection of their own security interest.83
The addition of section 9-402(5) to the 1957 Code did not resolve
the problem of whether financing statements filed under a debtor's
trade name were sufficient to perfect security interests represented by
those filings. Indeed, a number of cases arose in which the courts were
required to determine whether trade name financing statements contained only minor errors that were not seriously misleading." Although
no single method of analyzing the problem became widely adopted, the
early decisions under the 1957 and 1962 Codes attempted to make

80.

STATE OF

NEW YORK,

1956-RE481 (1956). See U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1957).

REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR

PORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

81. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1957).
82. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir.
1969); U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 5, examples I & 2 (1972). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 23, § 25-4, at 1037. See generally G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2 (1965).
83. See Kay Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc., 51 Bankr. 511
(E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Brawn, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1031 (D. Me. 1969).
84. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 478 (1980).
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judgments about the likelihood of a searcher finding the financing
statement containing only the debtor's trade name.8 5 The courts frequently indicated that the financing statement would be sufficient if a
reasonably prudent searcher would have found the trade name financing statement in a search of the appropriate records. 8 6 Of course, the
courts promulgated a variety of opinions regarding how "prudent" a
searcher had to be when reviewing the filed financing statements in an
appropriate recording office. Some courts focused on the similarity between the debtor's legal name and trade name and held financing statements under the similar trade name sufficient to perfect security interests.87 Other courts, however, held that such financing statements
would be insufficient, even under section 9-402(5)." In several other
cases, the courts considered matters extrinsic to the financing statement
to determine whether the financing statement contained only minor errors which were not seriously misleading. 8 ' For example, the courts in
several cases relied on the rural or small town location of the filing
system to find that reasonably prudent searchers would uncover trade
name financing statements which did not include the debtor's legal
name.' Other courts also held that financing statements filed under
trade names were sufficient to perfect security interests if the financing
statements were signed by the debtor in his or her individual capacity.' 1 In those cases, the courts held that the clerk had erroneously indexed the financing statement because the debtor's legal name was contained in the signature required by section 9-402(1). '9 Given the

85. See, e.g., John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 34 A.D.2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1970) (security interest was unperfected and unenforceable when the name of the debtor on
the handwritten, nonstandard form was so illegible that the filing clerk filed the financing statement under "Ranelli," instead of under the proper spelling "Ranalli"-the court held that a
"standard search" would not have uncovered the error).
86. See, e.g., id. at 88, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 948. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 478

(1980).
87. See. e.g.. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (debtor's name was Henry Platt
and the financing statement identified the debtor as "Platt Fur Co.").
88. See. e.g.. In re Lintz W. Side Lumber, Inc., 655 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1981); Kreling v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Webster), 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802 (W.D.
Mich. 1976); In re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
89. See, e.g.. Glasco, 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981) (debtor held itself out to the community
and to creditors under a trade name; checks, stationery, and bank accounts all contained the trade
name). Cf. In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 283, 287 (D. Conn. 1965) (financing
statement of debtor, Bruce R. Bengtson, identified as "Bruce's Vernon Circle Serv., Vernon Corner," contained sufficient mailing address because "Vernon Circle is a well known landmark and
mail would be delivered there").
90. See, e.g., In re Hatfield Constr. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 907 (M.D. Ga.
1971).
91. See. e.g.. McMillan v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799
(W.D. Okla. 1975).
92. See. e.g., id. at 804. See also U.C.C. 1 9-402(1) (1972).
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virtually unlimited scope of minor errors, the courts had a number of
opportunities to establish a relatively comprehensive analytical rule to
resolve whether technically insufficient financing statements could still
be considered effective because they contained only minor errors which
were not seriously misleading.9 8 Nevertheless, no more specific rule
than the "reasonably prudent searcher" rule developed from these earlier cases.
III. In re Glasco AND In re McBee
In the absence of a definitive rule, the courts continued to struggle
with the issue of whether section 9-402(5) of the 1962 Code, 94 and its
successor under the 1972 Code, section 9-402(8), 95 would render effective financing statements filed only under a debtor's trade name. The
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
In re Glasco," and its more recent decision, In re McBee,91 evidence a
trend toward applying the savings provision very liberally to protect
trade name filings. In Glasco, the court noted that the debtor held itself
out to the community and to its creditors as "Elite Boats, Division of
Glasco, Inc." 98 This name appeared on all of the debtor's stationery,
checks, and related items." Consequently, the court held that "listing
the debtor by the sole name in which it did business was not misleading, because any reasonably prudent creditor would have requested the
Secretary of State to search under 'Elite Boats' in addition to 'Glasco,
Inc.' "100 The court also noted that because the debtor was a corporation, cases involving individuals engaged in business under trade names
were not analogous to the Glasco facts and the trade name need not be
similar to the legal, corporate name to be effective. 10 1 According to the
Fifth Circuit, an individual engaged in business
is necessarily held out to the credit community under two names, that of
the individual and of the business. The individual's credit for personal
needs is unrelated to the business. A personal creditor would not necessarily be aware of the business or trade name, and thus may not discover

93. See generally Note, The Effect of Errors and Changes in the Debtor's Name on Article
Nine Security Interests, 1975 DuKE L.J. 148; Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 478 (1980).
94. U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1962).

95.

Id. § 9-402(8) (1972).

96. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. National Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316 (5th
Cir. 1983).
98. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 795.
99. Id. at 796.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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security interests filed solely under the business name. *s
The court then noted that in Glasco, the debtor had held itself out only
under one name-"Elite Boats. 103 Consequently, the court held the
financing statement to be sufficient under the Florida equivalent of section 9-402(5) of the 1972 Code.'"
In his dissent, Judge Tuttle indicated that some trade name filings
had, in his opinion, been appropriately upheld. 105 He described a case
in which the debtor's legal name and trade name were substantially
similar.106 In that instance, he indicated the similarity would be such
"that a searcher would be put on notice despite the technical error."1 07
For example, a searcher attempting to determine whether any financing
statements were on record against Henry Platt should be on notice of
financing statements filed under the name "Platt Fur Co."108 While
this analysis may also be too liberal, unlike the majority's opinion, it
Firecognizes the alphabetical limitations of an indexing system.'
nally, Judge Tuttle warned:
A searcher versed in the operation of the UCC would know that the
filings should be under the debtor's legal name. He would have no reason
to look under a trade name, even if he is aware of the trade name's
existence, because he should be able to rely on the.

.

. [secured credi-

tor] to submit the legal name and not a trade name. Future creditors
must now anticipate mistakes by would-be secured creditors in order not
to be ensnared in the hindsight of courts.110
Thus, Judge Tuttle noted that the future mischief that could detract
from the appropriate operation of the notice-filing system in article 9 is
the application of judicial hindsight to the scope of record searches for
financing statements."
Judge Tuttle's warnings about the future application of judicial
hindsight fell on deaf ears, however, even in his own circuit. Two years
after the Glasco decision, in In re McBee,"' the Fifth Circuit again
addressed the issue of whether a trade name financing statement was
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id. at 797-99 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (citing In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
107. Id. at 797.
108. See id.(quoting Platt, 257 F. Supp. at 482).
109. While a debtor's real name and trade name may be similar, they may not be adjacent
to each other in the filing index system. Therefore, a file searcher may not locate a financing
statement filed under a trade name if he or she is searching under the debtor's correct name.
dissenting).
110. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 799 (Tuttle, J.,
I11.
112.

See id.
714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
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sufficient to perfect a security interest in the inventory of a gun shop
owned by an individual. Relying heavily on Glasco, the McBee court
held that a financing statement identifying the debtor as "Oak Hill
Gun Shop" was sufficient to perfect a security interest in the inventory
of that store although the debtor's name was Cynthia K. McBee."'
While the facts are somewhat complex, the court in McBee had to determine whether a trade name financing statement was sufficient when
a business was owned by an individual." The court noted that the
business had been conducted under the same name both when it was
owned by McBee and when it was owned by her predecessor in title,
who also was an individual." 6 This consistent use of the name was
cited by the court as its reason for finding that a reasonably prudent
searcher would search under the trade name prior to lending money on
the basis of the business assets." 6 The court compared the consistent
use of the trade name in McBee with the consistent use of the trade
name in Glasco and found the "Oak Hill Gun Shop" financing statement sufficient under the Texas version of U.C.C. section 9402(8).1 7 The court did not note, however, that lenders of the individ-

113. Id. at 1325.
114. See id. at 1318-20. The facts in McBee are as follows: Joe Ben Colley owned and
operated the Oak Hill Gun Shop from January, 1979, until May, 1980. Meanwhile, in January,
1979, McBee approached the National Bank of Texas for a loan stating that she was Colley's
partner in the gun shop. Although no partnership existed, the bank made a loan to the gun shop as
debtor with McBee executing the documents as a partner in the enterprise. The bank then filed a
financing statement in the proper place under the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop." Id. at 1318. The
loan was secured by the inventory of the gun shop. Thereafter, West Texas Wholesale Supply
Company sold goods to the gun shop on a credit basis, filing a financing statement identifying the
debtor as "Joe B. Colley d/b/a Oak Hill Gun Shop." Id. Included among the collateral for this
loan was the inventory of the shop. Colley later transferred his interest in the gun shop to McBee.
Id. The transfer agreement provided that McBee would comply with the bulk transfer provisions
of article 6 of the U.C.C. Id. McBee obtained a loan from RepublicBank-Austin, again granting a
security interest in the inventory as well as other assets of the gun shop. Id.at 1318-19. RepublicBank filed its financing statement designating the debtor as "C. K. McBee dba Oak Hill Gun
Shop." Id. at 1318.
The relative complexity of the fact situation served to confuse the court in its resolution of
the problem. For example, the court spent a significant portion of its opinion addressing the issues
raised by McBee's failure to comply with the bulk sale provisions of the U.C.C. See id. at
1325-31. The court did not consider, however, the effect of the Texas equivalent of U.C.C. § 9306(2) which provides that the security interest of the gun shop under Colley's ownership would
continue to attach to the collateral even after its transfer to McBee. This attachment would continue even if the security interest was unperfected. While secured creditors are not excluded from
the protections provided by the bulk transfer article, their security interests and the operation of §
9-306(2) provide much greater protection for those creditors than the provisions of article 6.
Therefore, the court's extended analysis of article 6 issues suggests that it did not appreciate the
operation of § 9-306(2) and the interplay between articles 6 and 9 of the U.C.C.
115. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1323-24.
116. Id.at 1325.
117. Id.at 1324-25.
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ual proprietor for nonbusiness purposes still might have some reason for
determining whether the debtor's business assets were subject to security interests. Of course, those creditors searching the records under the
individual's legal name would not ascertain the existence of the trade
name financing statements. Therefore, to some degree the McBee
court's reliance on Glasco is misplaced. Most importantly, however, the
decision in McBee reinforces the notion that financing statements filed
only under a trade name may be sufficient to perfect security interests
in the debtor's assets. As noted by Judge Tuttle in his Glasco dissent, 1 18 the havoc this notion may wreak is enhanced by the subsequent
interpretation of U.C.C. section 9-402(8) in McBee and the scope of a
reasonably prudent search.
Glasco and McBee certainly evidence a dangerous trend in the interpretation of the minimum requirements for perfecting security interests by filing financing statements. While there are a number of other
decisions which do not grant the leeway for trade name filings that
these cases have awarded, 1 1 a number of courts have adopted the
Glasco/McBee analysis to find trade name financing statements sufficient to perfect a security interest even when there is no similarity between the debtor's legal and trade names.12 0 These decisions are dangerous precisely for the reason that Judge Tuttle noted in his
dissent-searchers now are directed to conduct article 9 searches under
a variety of names beyond that of the debtor's legal name.
While the cases may be read narrowly to permit trade name financing statements only when the debtor has held itself out under a
single trade name, even this restrictive analysis of the cases would not
provide protection for all subsequent searchers of the U.C.C. records.
For example, Glasco could have sought additional funding from a
lender with whom it had not previously dealt. Furthermore, this lender
could have been located across the country from Glasco's place of business. Thus, the potential lender might not be aware of the debtor's historical usage of a trade name. It is conceivable that Glasco would iden-

118. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 797-99 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
119. See. e.g., Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), II U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 673 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
223 (M.D. Ga.), afd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979); Bank of Miss. v. Panzetti (In re Hill), 13
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 724 (N.D. Miss. 1973); In re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1972); In re Swati, Inc., 54 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1985);
Bell v. AmeriTrust Co. (In re Moore), 21 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
120. See, e.g., Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc. (In re Beacon Realty Inv. Co.), 44
Bankr. 875 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Sounds Distrib. Corp. (In re
Sounds Distrib. Corp.), 42 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1984); First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald
(In re Lane), 41 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); Records & Tapes, Inc. v. Argus, Inc., 8
Kan. App. 2d 255, 655 P.2d 133 (1982).
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tify itself solely by the name Glasco, Inc., as this was the corporation's
legal name.1 2 ' Of course, it is more likely that the loan negotiations
would include correspondence between the parties with the debtor's stationery containing the name "Elite Boats, Division of Glasco, Inc." In
that event, the potential lender faces the dilemma of conducting a
search of the records under either "Elite Boats," "Glasco, Inc.," or
both names. Certainly, it is prudent to search under both names. Arguably, this is what some courts that have upheld trade name financing
statements have indicated.' That, however, does not end the analysis.
In order to preserve the integrity of the filing system, the maximum
required scope of a search should be the minimally prudent search. In
this circumstance, the minimally prudent search would be undertaken
under the legal name, Glasco, Inc. The following discussion will
demonstrate both why the "Glasco, Inc." search is the minimally prudent search and why the minimally prudent search is the appropriate
standard to employ in determining whether a particular financing statement is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not
seriously misleading.
IV.

THE MINIMALLY PRUDENT SEARCH

The minimally prudent search standard is the appropriate standard for courts to employ when determining whether particular financing statements are sufficient for article 9 purposes. This standard is
appropriate because it enhances the integrity of the filing system and is
consistent with the statutory requirements for the filing and indexing of
financing statements. Section 9-402(1) requires that the financing statement contain the debtor's name. 2 3 The debtor's name on the financing
statement is the most crucial item of information required by the article 9 notice-filing system because it is only through the debtor's name
that a subsequent searcher of the records can determine whether any
parties claim a security interest in the debtor's assets.' 2' Consequently,
the first duty of a filing officer after accepting the financing statement' 25 is to "index the statement according to the name of the debtor
and . . . note in the index the file number and the address of the

121. See Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
122. See. e.g., Beacon Realty Inv. Co., 44 Bankr. at 879; Lane, 41 Bankr. at 288.
123. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972).
124. This is because § 9-403(4) requires the filing officer to maintain an index according to
the debtors' names and to make the index available for public inspection. Id. § 9-403(4).
125. See id. § 9-403(1). A financing statement is filed simply by presenting the statement to
the appropriate filing officer and tendering the filing fee. Id. Therefore, if the officer fails to index
the financing statement or improperly indexes the statement, the financing statement is nonetheless effective. See McLaughlin, supra note 62, at 972, 983-86.
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debtor given in the statement.""" 6 Thus, a subsequent searcher will attempt to ascertain whether any financing statements are on record
under the name which the searcher has chosen to use in the search. If
the index includes any financing statements listed under the name chosen by the searcher, the actual financing statement itself is then available for inspection.12 7 At this time, the searcher can ascertain the
description of collateral, the identity of the secured creditor, and any
additional information included on the statement. If the name chosen
by the searcher is not included in the index, the searcher will receive no
notice of financing statements that may otherwise be filed.1"
Article 9 employs a notice-filing system which does not require
creditors to describe in complete detail the provisions of their agreement with the debtor.129 Instead, only skeletal information regarding
the underlying transaction is required. The financing statement need
only contain a listing of collateral by item or by type that may be subject to a security interest.18 0 Furthermore, article 9 countenances broad
31
descriptions of collateral as sufficient for section 9-402(1) purposes. ,
Thus, a creditor who has a security interest in two drill presses pursuant to a written security agreement with the debtor may describe the
2
collateral in the financing statement as "all equipment."'' 1 The
description will be sufficient to perfect the security interest in the two
machines, although it will not operate to perfect a security interest in
machines other than those covered by the security agreement executed
by the parties.133 In addition, the creditor need not include any indication on the financing statement regarding the extent of the indebtedness owed by the debtor nor the payment terms or final payment date
for any loan made to the debtor and secured by the described collat-

126.

U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1972).

127.

See id.

128. Upon searching the records, the searcher would conclude that there are no financing
statements covering the debtor's personal property. While this would not ensure that no security
interests exist, in many instances it would provide sufficient notice for the searcher to go forward
with a secured transaction. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 62.
129. See G.GILMORE, supra note 82, at 471-80; Coogan, supra note 62, at 317-19.
130. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972).
131. See id. § 9-110. The description of the collateral need not be exact; rather, it is sufficient "if it reasonably identifies what is described." Id. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 23, § 23-16, at 961-64.
132. See supra note 131. See also Waterfield v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 21 Bankr. 752
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
133. See In re Platt, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 275, 279 (Bankr. E.D. Pa,) ("A
description of the collateral in the financing statement that is broader than that contained in the
security agreement does not have the effect of enlarging or broadening the security interest beyond that granted in the security agreement."), vacated on other grounds. 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
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eral. 134 In that sense, the article 9 notice-filing system requires only a
brief sketch of the transaction between the secured creditor and the
debtor. Given the significance of the debtor's name to the indexing system, however, generalities as to the identification of the debtor are
inappropriate.
The Code specifically provides that file searchers cannot rely completely on the description of collateral in a financing statement as evidencing a security interest in those particular assets of the debtor.' 35
Moreover, section 9-402(1) provides that a creditor may file a financing
statement prior to the time that any security interest attaches. 136 Indeed, the priority provisions encourage this pre-transaction filing. 37
Thus, the collateral listed on a financing statement may not be subject
to any security interest. Because searchers may not rely completely on
the information contained in the financing statement to determine the
status of security interests in the debtor's property, the Code includes a
system for obtaining that information elsewhere."' If a searcher identifies a financing statement in which a security interest in some of the
debtor's property is claimed, the creditor can, through the debtor, obtain information from the other secured party regarding the extent of
the collateral and debt existing between the debtor and the secured
creditor who filed the financing statement.'" This information retrieval
system supplants the need for detailed information about actual collateral claimed and the amount of outstanding indebtedness in the skeletal
notice filing system. The information is nonetheless crucial, and the
Code provides a means to obtain that information. 4 0 The Code cannot
and does not, however, contain any means for finding financing statements other than by beginning the search with knowledge of the
debtor's name.

134. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). Georgia, however, has recently amended its version of §
9-402(1) by adding a requirement that the financing statement include the maturity date of the
obligation or indicate that the secured obligation is not subject to a maturity date. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 11-9-402(1) (Supp. 1985). See generally Carson, Conrad & Dobbs, H.B. 712: New Requirements for Financing Statements and Continuation Statements Filed in Georgia, 22 GA. ST.
B.J. 6 (1985).
135. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
136. U.C.C. § 9-402(l) (1972).
137. Section 9-312(5) provides that in a priority contest between creditors holding nonpurchase money security interests in the same collateral, the first creditor to either file a financing
statement or otherwise perfect the security interest in the collateral has the superior claim. Id. §
9-312(5). This priority rule combines with the authorization of pre-attachment filings of financing
statements in § 9-402(1) to encourage the filing of financing statements at the earliest possible
time.
138. See id. § 9-208.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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V.

U.C.C. SECTION 9-402(7)

Section 9-402(1) requires that the financing statement include the
debtor's name; 14'1 however, it does not define precisely what constitutes
a debtor's name. Rather, the 1972 amendments to article 9 added section 9-402(7) to clarify the issue of the appropriate name to identify
debtors in financing statements. 1 4 2 The Review Committee for article 9
noted in its report:
A perpetual question has existed whether in filing against sole proprietorships or partnership debtors one may use a trade name, or
whether the individual name of a proprietor is required, and whether the
names of partners are required to be shown as debtors. There is substantial lack of uniformity in state instructions to filing officers with respect
to these matters. The Committee hopes to clarify these issues by its proposed Section 9-402(7) that one files against a partnership by the name
in which it is known and that one files against an individual by his individual name. Neither the names of partners nor a trade name for individuals or partnerships need be shown. The Committee has considered
the California provision that a trade name should be shown, but it seems
to create too great a risk of insufficient filing, because a secured party
may not know of a trade name sometimes informally used by a debtor.
Trade name statutes vary so widely in scope and in the effects of complireance or non-compliance that it has not seemed feasible to tie14any
8
quirements as to trade names to the existence of such statutes.
The official comments to the 1972 Code employed similar language to
explain the addition of subsection (7) to section 9-402. Comment 7
states in part:
Subsection (7) undertakes to deal with some of the problems as to
who is the debtor. In the case of individuals, it contemplates filing only
in the individual name, not in a trade name. In the case of partnerships
it contemplates filing in the partnership name, not in the names of any of
the partners, and not in any other trade names. Trade names are deemed
to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the secured party or
person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system. How9-403(5) for indexing in a trade name
ever, provision is made in Section
14 4
if the secured party so desires.

Thus, the drafters of section 9-402(7) intended to resolve the problem of trade name financing statements by directing that financing
statements be filed under the individual, partnership, or corporate name

141.
142.
143.
144.

U.C.C.
See id.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.

§ 9-402(l) (1972).
§ 9-402(7).
Article 9 General Comment 1-9, 3 U.L.A. 49, 49 (1981).
§ 9-402 comment 7 (1972).
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of the debtor and not under a trade name. Certainly, the drafters could
have adopted more direct language to resolve the problem. 1," Nevertheless, their failure to do so should not allow one to infer that the drafters
condoned the practice of filing financing statements solely under the
debtor's trade name.
The addition of section 9-402(7) to the U.C.C. was intended not
only to resolve the problems evidenced by trade name cases throughout
the country," but was also in response to the California provision
which, at that time, required the inclusion of the debtor's trade name
on financing statements.1 17 The California Commercial Code then provided that financing statements had to include a trade name or style if
the debtor was conducting business under a trade name or style.14'8 California has since retreated from this position and presently only "encourages" creditors to include any known trade name or style of the
debtor."1 9 The California statute, however, further provides that "a
failure to include such trade name or style shall not under any circumstances affect the validity of the financing statement."1 50 This suggestion in the California Commercial Code, that trade names be included
on the financing statement when known, is consistent with the U.C.C.
Section 9-403(5) of the U.C.C. provides: "The secured party may at
his option show a trade name for any person .... "15 Both this section of the U.C.C. and section 9402(1) of the California Commercial

145.

See Note, Trade Name Filing: Should It Be Sufficient to Perfect a Security Interest

Under U.C.C. Section 9-402?, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 51, 60 (1984). This student commentator
observed:
It seems apparent that the Code drafters could have created a per se rule. The Alabama
version of the Code contains an absolute requirement: "The name of the debtor in the
financing statement shall be the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor,
regardless of trade names or the names of partners."
Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 7-9-402(7) (1984)).
146. See U.C.C. Article 9 General Comment 1-9, 3 U.L.A. 223-24 (1978); U.C.C. § 9-402
comment 7 (1972).
147. See U.C.C. Article 9 General Comment 1-9, 3 U.L.A. 223-24 (1978). See also CAL.
COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West 1972) (amended 1974).
148. CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West 1972) (amended 1974). The statute provided, inter
alia, that "[t]he financing statement shall also set forth ... if the debtor is doing business under
a trade name or style, such trade name or style." d. See National Cash Register Co. v. Danning
(In re Thrift Shoe Co.), 502 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1974) (mandate of pre-amended § 9402(1)
is mandatory disclosure of trade names).
149. CAL COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1986). The California Legislature amended
the statute in 1974 to provide currently: "A financing statement should include the debtor's trade
name or style, if any, if known to the secured party, but a failure to include such trade name or
style shall not under any circumstances affect the validity of the financing statement." Id. See
Chartered Bank v. Diamant (In re Del Norte Depot, Inc.), 716 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1983)
(amended § 9402(1) allows permissive listing of trade names).
150. CAL COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1986).
151. U.C.C. § 9-403(5) (1972).
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Code encourage creditors to add trade names to financing statements,
but neither requires the inclusion of the trade name. 15' The same is
true of section 9-402(7) of the U.C.C. Therefore, it is inappropriate to
suggest that section 9-402(7) authorizes or validates financing statements containing only the debtor's trade name.
At the time of the initial proposal of section 9-402(7), one commentator noted that under the new provision, "[i]f the debtor operates
a business as sole proprietor under a trade name it will be essential that
the debtor's individual name be used whether or not his trade name is
added ... -"I The commentator further noted:

The better practice will be to use both the debtor's own name and the
trade name and to have the filing officer index the financing statement
against each. If double indexing is impractical, separate financing statements may be filed, one showing the debtor's individual name and the
other the trade name. '"
The suggestion that the debtor's trade name be included on the financing statement was not made to indicate that it was legally necessary for
perfection. Rather, it is the "better practice" to include the trade name
because it would render the financing statement more discoverable and
essentially immune from any claim that the creditor's security interest
was not perfected. The cost of cross-indexing or an extra filing is de
minimus compared to the costs of defending, even briefly, an action in
which another party asserts that the creditor's filing was insufficient.
Thus, the addition of the trade name represents an act of prudence
by the secured creditor making the filing, and not an act of prudence in
a record search by a subsequently interested party. That is not to suggest, however, that it is not prudent to conduct a search under the
trade name. 155 Nonetheless, the inclusion of a debtor's trade name by a
filing secured creditor is not for the purpose of compliance with the
filing statute; rather, the purpose of the inclusion is to obtain added
"insurance" against a subsequent attack on the security interest. The
commentator's recognition of this practice, along with the references in
U.C.C. section 9-402(7) and in California Commercial Code section
9402(1)-that trade names may be included on the financing statement
or cross-indexed in the clerk's files-are consistent and recognize the
"protective" nature of the inclusion of the debtor's trade name on the
financing statement.
152. See id.; CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1986).
153. Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Bus.
LAw. 321, 330 (1971).
154.

Id.

155. See infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
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9-402(8)

As section 9-402(7) does not provide realistic support for a court
to find that a debtor's trade name on a financing statement is sufficient,
by itself, to render the financing statement effective, other statutory
support is necessary to permit the court to find trade name financing
statements effective for article 9 purposes. The courts have employed
the savings provision of U.C.C. section 9-402(8)156 to find trade name
financing statements effective.' 57 Reliance on that "savings provision"
is erroneous.
Section 9-402(8) operates only when a financing statement is technically deficient.1 58 It renders effective a financing statement that contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading to a subsequent
searcher of the record.' 59 Thus, application of the section to save an
otherwise insufficient financing statement requires that the party asserting the validity of the financing statement prove that the error is a
minor one and that it does not render the financing statement seriously
misleading.' 60 The section does not, however, contain any description or
listing of minor errors.
As noted previously, financing statements must contain six basic
items of information: the name of the debtor, the name of the secured
party, the debtor's signature, an address of the secured creditor, the
debtor's mailing address, and a description of the collateral. 6' Of these
six items of information, the first enumerated item is the most important. The system depends on the debtor's name to make pertinent information available to interested parties. Financing statements are indexed under the debtor's name, and it is under that name that
subsequent record searchers will focus their attempts to determine the
status of secured claims. Consequently, a lesser degree of error is permissible with respect to a debtor's name than with respect to any other

156. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1972).
157. See, e.g., National Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316 (5th Cir. 1983); Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
1981); Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc. (In re Beacon Realty Inv. Co.), 44 Bankr. 875
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Sounds Distrib. Corp. (In re Sounds Distrib. Corp.), 42 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1984); First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald (In re Lane),
41 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Maples, 33 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983);
Records & Tapes, Inc. v. Argus, Inc., 5 Kan. App. 2d 255, 655 P.2d 133 (1982).
158. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1972). The savings provision provides: "A financing statement
substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains
minor errors which are not seriously misleading." Id.
159. Id.
160. See Kay Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc., 51 Bankr.
511 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
161. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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item of information required in the financing statement. 2
Section 9-402(8) clearly directs the courts to overlook minor errors
that secured creditors might make in completing the required information for the financing statement. Errors in the debtor's or secured creditor's address generally would not be seriously misleading to a subsequent searcher of the U.C.C. records. 16 Likewise, if a creditor
attempts to describe the collateral in the financing statement by means
of a lengthy serial number for a particular good and mistakenly transposes two of the nine numbers in the serial number, the error is minor
and would not be seriously misleading. '" Transposing two letters in a
debtor's name, however, could very likely be seriously misleading. Several examples will show the extent to which a subsequent file searcher
can be misled by that transpositional error.
Assume for example that the debtor's name is "Hedrick." If a secured creditor incorrectly identified the debtor as "Hedirck," a subsequent file searcher might not discover a financing statement filed under
the incorrect name. 16 When the transpositional error occurs at the beginning of the name, the likelihood of the incorrect filing being seriously misleading increases dramatically. Thus, a financing statement
filed under the name "Naglin" would not be discovered in a search
under the debtor's correct name, "Anglin." Therefore, the liberal treatment which the courts have accorded to financing statements that contain incorrect descriptions of collateral due to erroneous serial numbers
are not authority for rendering financing statements with transposed
letters in a debtor's name effective for article 9 purposes.'"
162. See In re Brawn. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1031 (D. Me. 1969); Bank of N.
Am. v. Bank of Nutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967). See also D. BAKER, A LAWYER'S BASIC GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS 102-06 (1983); B. CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE T 2.9[1], at 2-34 (1980).
163. See, e.g., Young v. Republic Nat'l Factors Corp. (In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd.), 13 Bankr.
600 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). If the financing statement omits the addresses, however, the statement may be held defective. See First Nat'l Bank v. Niccum (In re Permian Anchor Serv., Inc.),
649 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1981); In re Keefer, 26 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983). But see
Rooney v. Mason, 394 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1968); In re French, 317 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D. Tenn.
1970).
164. See, e.g., Adams v. Nuffer, 550 P.2d 181 (Utah 1976). Cf. Appleway Leasing, Inc. v.
Wilken, 39 Or. App. 43, 591 P.2d 382 (1979). Transposition of numbers within a serial number
could be seriously misleading, however, if the number, as transposed, identifies another item of the
debtor's equipment. See Id. at 47, 591 P.2d at 384. But in Appleway Leasing, an incorrect or
nonexistent serial number was apparently not seriously misleading when the farmer-debtor owned
only one tractor because the description of the collateral was otherwise sufficient to reasonably
identify it. See id.
165. The financing statement presumably would be located in a significantly different position in the index as a result of the transposition of the letters thereby preventing a searcher from
finding the statement.
166. Cf. Putterbaugh v. Fournier (In re Happy Jack's Restaurant, Inc.), 29 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 653 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (transposition of debtor's and creditor's names on the
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It would be misleading to suggest, however, that section 9-402(8)
is not intended to validate financing statements containing incorrect
names for debtors. The section exists largely in response to cases in
which a minor error in a debtor's name operated to render ineffective a
notice filing even though the name contained on the notice probably
was not misleading. 67 Thus, the heritage of section 9-402(8) of the
1972 Code includes among its purposes a protection of minor errors in
debtor names. Nonetheless, the name errors described in the drafting
history of section 9-402(8) generally are not comparable to the errors
resulting when a creditor identifies a debtor solely by the debtor's trade
name.
The interpretation of U.C.C. section 9-402(8) requires courts to
balance competing interests. On the one hand, the Code has adopted a
notice-filing system, 16 8 and a rule that requires strict adherence to the
form of financing statements provided would enhance the integrity of
the notice-filing system. On the other hand, insistance on totally errorfree filings could result in a secured creditor who has made a good faith
effort to comply with the Code requirements and whose financing statement has not, and would not, mislead subsequent searchers, being deprived of an opportunity to recover its claim out of the collateral." 9
Section 9-402(8) specifically rejects the latter analysis. The Code does,
however, limit a court's authority to find defective financing statements
sufficient to instances in which the defects are minor and not seriously
misleading. The nature of the error is paramount in determining the
extent to which it might mislead subsequent searchers. Therefore, as
noted previously, a mistake in a serial number generally will not be
seriously misleading, while a mistake in the spelling of a debtor's name
oftentimes would be misleading. 7 0 In analyzing the defective financing
statements presented to them, the courts have focused primarily on
whether the financing statement would seriously mislead a "reasonably
prudent searcher."' 7 The application of this test has proven to be especially problematic when the asserted defect in the financing statement
is the use of a trade name for the debtor rather than the debtor's actual
72
legal name.1
Those courts that have employed section 9-402(8) to render effec-

financing statement renders the filing ineffective).
167. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Coogan, supra note 62.
169. See U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 9 (1972).
170. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
171. See. e.g., Dietrich-Post Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank (In re McCauley's Reprographics,
Inc.), 638 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Southern Supply Co., 405 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.N.C.
1975). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 23-16, at 947-58.
172. See Note, supra note 145, at 56.
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tive trade name financing statements that do not include the debtor's
actual name have found that a reasonably prudent searcher would have
located the financing statement in question.1 73 In several cases, the
debtor's trade name and legal name were substantially similar." 4
When there was a substantial disparity between those names, however,
the courts generally held that the financing statement was insufficient
to perfect the creditor's security interest.7 5 More recently, however,
the courts have been more favorably disposed towards expanding the
scope of a search expected of a reasonably prudent creditor to include a
search of the records under a trade name which is dissimilar to the
debtor's legal name.1 7 For example, in both In re McBee1 77 and In re
Glasco,1 7 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that a reasonably prudent searcher would have located financing
statements filed under dissimilar trade names. 7
In both cases, the court addressed its attention to a reasonably
prudent searcher who would conduct the most cautious and all-encompassing search of the U.C.C. records.1 80 The court did not consider at
any length the ability of the filing secured creditor to ascertain the
debtor's correct legal name.1 81 Instead, the court determined that persons investigating the debtor would become aware of the debtor's trade
name. 182 Because those searchers would be cognizant of the trade
name, the court determined that the financing statement filed under the
trade name was sufficient to provide notice to those searchers.1 83
While a searcher who investigated the debtor's business and financial affairs sufficiently to determine the existence of a trade name

173. See, e.g., McCauley's Reprographics, 638 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1981); Southern Supply
Co., 405 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
174. See, e.g., In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In re Hatfield, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 907 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1971). But see, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F.
Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga.), afifd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
175. See, e.g., Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785 (2d
Cir. 1972); In re Hill, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 724 (N.D. Miss. 1973); In re Wilhoit, 29
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1697 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). But see, e.g., In re Kann, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1965).
176. See. e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald (In re Lane), 41 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1984).
177. National Bank v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316 (5th
Cir. 1983).
178. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981).
179. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321; Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
180. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321; Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
181. See McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321; Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
182. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1323-25; Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
183. See McBee, 714 F.2d at 1323-25; Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
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would be prudent and would likely have notice of the trade name financing statement, the real issue is whether a less comprehensive investigation would also be prudent even though the trade name filing would
not be discoverable. A party interested in determining whether there
are any particular financing statements on record must conduct both a
legal and factual investigation. Legally, the searcher must determine
the classification of the collateral, 6 4 the location of the collateral,"8 5
the debtor's location, 8 6 and the debtor's name.18 7 Of course, those legal
judgments cannot be determined without factual support. Therefore,
the searcher must take appropriate steps to obtain the factual information requisite to determining the legal issues. The searcher must ascertain factually the use to which the collateral is being put,188 the present
and immediate past locations of the collateral, 89 the present and prior
location of the debtor,1' 0 and the debtor's current and former.names.19 1

184. Section 9-401 of the U.C.C. provides three alternative provisions to determine the correct location for filing financing statements. See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1972). In each alternative,
the appropriate filing office is established wholly or partially according to the nature or classification of the collateral. Id.
185. For example, if the collateral is a fixture or minerals, or if the debtor is a nonresident
of the state, the financing statement must be filed in an office locationally related to the collateral.
See id. § 9-401(1). Furthermore, alternative subsection (3) of § 9-401 provides that security interests perfected by filing can become unperfected if the collateral is moved to another location
within the state. Id. § 9-401(3) (alternative subsection (3)). Finally, the interstate movement of
certain collateral can render financing statements ineffective. See id. § 9-103(1)(b). Therefore, the
location of the collateral determines the proper place to file a financing statement in many
instances.
186. The third alternative subsection (1) of § 9-401 provides that the place of filing depends
on the debtor's location unless the debtor has more than one place of business in the state. Id. § 9401(l)(c) (third alternative subsection (1)). Moreover, the location of the debtor establishes the
filing rules for nonpossessory security interests in mobile goods, accounts, general intangibles, and
chattel paper. See id. § 9-103(3)(b).
187. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
188. The classification of collateral is often crucial to the filing location decision, see supra
note 184, and that classification frequently turns on the debtor's use of the collateral. See, e.g., In
re Morton, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1147, 1148 (D. Me. 1971) (jeep bought primarily for
personal use is a consumer good). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 23-13.
189. A searcher needs to be aware of the current location of the collateral to determine the
appropriate office in which to conduct a search. The searcher also needs to know the immediate
past location of the collateral because it may still be covered by financing statements filed where
the collateral had been located. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401(3), 9-103(l)(b) (1972). See also supra note
185.
190. A searcher must be aware of the debtor's location to determine the appropriate filing
office to search. For example, the third alternative subsection (1) of § 9-401 requires filing in both
a centralized and local office if the debtor has a place of business in only one county in the state.
U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972) (third alternative subsection (1)). Thus, the searcher must know the location or locations of the debtor's business to determine the appropriate filing office. Furthermore, if
the collateral consists of mobile goods, accounts, general intangibles, or chattel paper which are
not in the creditor's possession, the debtor's location will govern the choice of law rules that determine perfection. See id. § 9-103(3), (4).
191. Because the indexing system is based on the debtor's name, the searcher needs that
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Upon concluding this investigation and analysis, however, the creditor
should be in a position to determine whether any security interests exist
in the debtor's property. 9 2 By combining the factual information with

legal analysis of the filing requirements, the searcher can determine the
appropriate filing office in which to search for financing statements as
well as the location within that filing office where any financing state-

ments must appear.
As indicated above, the U.C.C. directs creditors to file financing

statements under the debtor's legal name. 193 While it may also be "prudent" to seek out trade names,'$' the statute does not require it. Thus,

it should also be considered prudent or reasonable to focus the investigation and analysis on determining the debtor's correct legal name.

Once the searcher determines the appropriate office in which to
search and the appropriate place within that office where the financing

statement should appear, it only remains for the searcher to conduct
the physical search of the record. Nonetheless, the scope of the search
physically conducted should be limited greatly by the searcher's pre-

search investigation and analysis. Consequently, the searcher should receive notice of only those financing statements which a search of the
particular records in the determined scope would disclose. If the financing statement is not indexed within the parameters of the "prudent
scope and search," then the financing statement should not be rendered

effective by section 9-402(8). Rather, the defective financing statement
is seriously misleading because the searcher cannot discover it.
Once the scope of the search is determined, it then becomes necesinformation. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. The file searcher also needs to know
any previously used names of the debtor because a financing statement previously and properly
filed under the prior name remains effective as to the collateral described in the financing statement as well as to any other collateral obtained by the debtor within four months after the name
change occurred. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972). See generally Westbrook, Glitch: Section 9-402(7)
and the U.C.C. Revision Process, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 408 (1984). Thus, if the collateral is a
piece of equipment and is properly described in a financing statement properly filed under the
debtor's name, that financing statement will remain effective for that equipment for five years,
even though the debtor changes its name one day after the financing statement is filed. See id. §
9-403(2). But cf. Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.), 503 F.2d 1218
(6th Cir. 1974) (filing under name of a corporation which immediately intends to change its name
renders the financing statement ineffective if the secured creditor has knowledge of the impending
name change).
192. A file search may not, however, turn up all security interests in the property. See supra
note 125.
193. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -305, -401, -402, -403, -405 (1972). See also supra notes 18-26
and accompanying text.
194. It is "prudent" to conduct the search under the trade name because it may lead the
searcher to a claimed security interest of a third party. The sea:cher then could evaluate the
"prior" claim to determine whether to extend credit to the debtor. The existence of the filing,
albeit defective, renders it likely that a subsequent party could face a priority contest in the event
that the debtor fails or is unable to pay off all related debts.
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sary to consider the form of the information retrieval system to determine whether the searcher would find the financing statement in question. For example, a retrieval system operated by a "literal" computer
search would not disclose the same information as would a search conducted manually. Thus, the scope of the search must then be tested
against the form of the retrieval system to determine if an otherwise
defective financing statement contains only minor errors that are not
seriously misleading.
In a manual retrieval system, the searcher would have personal
access to the U.C.C. index. At a minimum, the searcher must look
carefully at two names. Consider, for example, a filing system index
containing only the following names:
Adams
Booth
Carr
Davis
Edwards
Assuming that the pre-search investigation and analysis has led the
searcher to this particular index, the status of the index at the time the
search is conducted will determine whether a financing statement is
properly filed. Suppose, for example, the debtor's name for purposes of
this search is Chester. The reasonably prudent searcher must view two
names in the index: Carr and Davis. The searcher need not, however,
look at any other names in the index. Whenever a manual search of an
alphabetical index occurs, the maximum number of names that the
searcher must view in the index to complete a prudent search is two
plus the number of names corresponding with the search request.
Therefore, if there were three financing statements indexed under the
name Chester in the foregoing example, the searcher would have to
look at five financing statements to complete a reasonably prudent
search. The two additional index names must be examined in order to
determine to a certainty that no other financing statements are on file
under the name Chester. Therefore, if the financing statement was erroneously filed under the name Donahue, the searcher would not discover the financing statement as it would be outside the scope of the
reasonably prudent search.
Of course, not all filing systems are available for private inspection
by the searcher'" or even in typewritten form. Either the clerk in the

195. See, e.g.. In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 583 (D.
Me. 1970). In this case, the clerk conducted the record search based on the name or names supplied by the interested party. Id. at 592. The interested party, however, did not have access to the
index. Id. at 591-92.
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recording office may conduct the manual search on behalf of the creditor, or the records may be kept in a computer file.'" If the clerk performs the index search, it is likely that he or she would report only
those financing statements indexed in the exact form contained on the
creditor's search request. 1 7 Arguably, it would be more appropriate to
report a finding on exactly the same lines as the searcher's manual
search described immediately above. Nevertheless, the searcher normally has no control over the search policy of the recording office although he or she could request that the clerk provide the names in the
index that would appear immediately before and immediately after the
specific name contained on the search request.
The introduction of computers into the process should not alter the
analysis. Again, once the scope of a prudent search is established, the
mechanical search should be undertaken in that system. If the financing statement in question would be discovered through that search,
then the statement should be effective under section 9-402(8). Frequently, the search request will be taken literally by the computer and
will generate only information on financing statements containing the
exact name contained in the request. In that sense, the computer is
similar to the clerk who is operating under the strict search guidelines
of the recording office. Like the clerk, the computer can be instructed
to conduct the search consistent with the manual search that the actual
searcher would undertake. That is, the computer could be programmed
to display the indexed financing statements that appear in the index
immediately before and immediately after the name contained in the
search request. Again, if the financing statement appears on that list, it
should arguably be rendered effective even if it contains minor errors.
Employing this analysis to determine whether specific financing
statements are sufficient under section 9-402(8) would add greatly to
the integrity of the filing system. The courts and parties could determine with much greater certainty whether a particular financing statement is sufficient. This should benefit the operation of the notice filing
system. Of course, the analysis proposed would increase the burdens on
the searcher to ascertain the debtor's correct name.
Placing this burden on the filing secured creditor is appropriate. In
fact, the Code already has placed that burden on the creditor. 1 " Furthermore, it is the filing secured creditor who is seeking the protection

196. If the filing information is held in computer files, access to the index is restricted to the
specific information requested. See Note, supra note 145, at 56 n.46, 70-71.
197. See supra note 195. See also Self, supra note 26, at 125-26 ("Information searches
conducted by the [U.C.C.] Bureau by rule include only filings that exactly match the name and
address requested to be searched.") (emphasis added).
198. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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of the notice-filing system. 199 Requiring relatively strict compliance
with the requirements for naming the debtor in the financing statement
is a small price to pay for the protection received.
Moreover, the subsequent searcher of the records receives absolutely no assistance if he or she fails to ascertain the debtor's correct
legal name in the context of the search. That is, if the subsequent
searcher misspells the debtor's name, the search will not locate financing statements otherwise properly filed. In a subsequent priority contest
with the previously filed creditor, the searcher will not receive any benefit from the fact that the mistake made in conducting the search was
made in good faith. Likewise, if the searcher relies on a generally publicized trade name of a debtor and conducts a search under that name,
that would not render a financing statement previously filed under the
debtor's correct legal name insufficient. As a result, the subsequent
searcher would again be subordinate to the previous-filing secured creditor.2 00 In each instance, the searcher's failure to conduct the search
under the debtor's correct legal name results in a subordinate position
to the prior filed creditor. The analysis suggested in this article is a
mirror image of this treatment. Simply stated, when the prior filing
secured creditor places a financing statement in the notice system in
such a manner that a reasonably prudent search would not disclose the
statement, the creditor has not filed an effective financing statement
and its security interest is unperfected.
It might be argued that section 9-402(8) is a "savings" provision
and should be construed liberally to protect those who may come
within its sphere. 20 1 The foregoing analysis does not prevent such liberal application. It simply limits the liberality to the items of information required in financing statements other than the debtor's name.
With respect to the debtor's name, however, the liberality should be
tempered by the purpose of including the debtor's name on the financing statement in the first place. If the name included on the financing
statement is incorrect and would not be disclosed in a search of the

199. The filing creditor is seeking to establish priority for his claim to the debtor's assets
described in the security agreement and financing statement. See Baird, Notice Filing and the
Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J.LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983).

200. The financing statement would be sufficient even if it omits the debtor's trade name.
See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 23-16, at 959. The
general priority rule contained in § 9-312(5) would render the first creditor's security interest
superior to any subsequently filed security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972).
201. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 23-15, at 950-51. One of these authors
describes § 9-401(2) as a savings provision which is intended to operate as "a backward-looking
provision that allows the judge to clean up a mess after the fact." Id. Consequently, he urges that
the provision be broadly construed to validate technically deficient financing statements. Id. A
similar argument could be made respecting § 9-402(8).
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debtor's correct legal name, the error is not a minor one and, furthermore, is seriously misleading.20 Only if the incorrect name would be
found through a minimally prudent search of the index should the
name error be considered minor and not seriously misleading.
VII. A SECOND SAVINGS PROVISION: U.C.C. SECTION 9-401(2)
A comparison of section 9-402(8) with another savings provision of
article 9-section 9-401(2)20 3-further supports the application of the
analysis proposed in this article. Section 9-402(8) will save a financing
statement whether or not the subsequent searcher is aware of the financing statement."' Section 9-401(2), on the other hand, renders improperly located financing statements effective only as against parties
who "have knowledge of the contents of the financing statement.", 5
That section is the only provision in article 9 that permits actual knowledge to override the operation of the notice-filing system.20 In a sense,
it scraps the notice-filing system in favor of determining priorities
based on the knowledge of the competing claimants. Moreover, it substitutes this knowledge only when the financing statement meets all of
the informational requirements of section 9-402(1). The only mistake
that the filing secured creditor makes is in choosing the appropriate
filing office. Moreover, since the improperly filed statement is effective
only when the conflicting claimant has knowledge of its contents, the
Code anticipates that both the initial filing secured creditor and the
subsequent searcher erroneously determined that a particular filing office was the appropriate location for filing. Therefore, since the parties
each filed or searched in the same incorrect filing office, there arguably
is good reason to permit the financing statement to be effective as between those two parties. The determination of the appropriate office in
202. See Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1972); In re LFT, Ltd., 36 Bankr. 411 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984). But see McBee, 714 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1983); Glasco, 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981).
203. U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972). This section provides:
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places
required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to which
the filing complied with the requirements of this Article and is also effective with regard to
collateral covered by the financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the
contents of such financing statement.
Id.
204. Id. § 9-402(8). See also supra notes 156-202 and accompanying text.
205. U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1972). See, e.g., Marcus v. McKesson Drug Co. (In re Mistura,
Inc.), 24 Bankr. 586 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd. 705 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds, McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
206. Actual knowledge of a seriously misleading financing statement will not render the
financing statement effective under § 9-402(8), even as against the party having actual knowledge.
See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1972).
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which to file is a much more difficult decision in the absence of a centralized filing system than is determining the debtor's correct legal
name. Judgment decisions regarding the number and location of the
debtor's business outlets and the forms of business being conducted can
07
lead to the filing of a financing statement in the wrong place.1 Of
course, the secured creditor can always take the prudent course and file
financing statements in all of the possibly correct locations. Nonetheless, section 9-401(2) saves the incorrectly filed financing statement, arguably because the decision of where to file can be very difficult and
has caused a subsequent searcher to search in the same records.20 8
Thus, the subsequent searcher's actual knowledge is deemed sufficient
to provide the notice necessary to render the statement effective.
The same is not true, however, for section 9-402(8) purposes. For
example, if a secured creditor files a financing statement in the correct
place with all of the information required by section 9-402(1) except
for the correct description of the collateral on the financing statement,
a subsequent creditor who has knowledge of the contents of the financing statement may not be subject to the secured creditor's claim. If the
financing statement describes collateral in which the secured creditor
does not have a security interest because it was not included in the
security agreement,2 09 the subsequent party will not be subordinate to
the prior filer simply because of the knowledge of the contents of the
statement. Likewise, if a secured creditor inadvertently switches the
debtor's and secured creditor's names on the financing statement, a
subsequent creditor who has actual knowledge of the contents of the
financing statement nonetheless will defeat the prior filed secured creditor in a contest over the collateral which each creditor claims.2 0 The
switching of names is not a minor error; therefore, section 9-402(8) is
not applicable. Furthermore, knowledge of a prior security interest is
irrelevant in resolving priority disputes between security interests in the
same collateral."' Thus, the use of a name in a financing statement

207.

See supra note 190.

208. See, e.g., In re Enark Indus., Inc., 86 Misc. 2d 985, 383 N.Y.S.2d 796 (App. Term.
1976).
209. If the security agreement does not include a description of the collateral listed on the
financing statement, no security interest will attach to the property and the filing will not perfect
any interest in the property. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1), 9-303 (1972). Because the security interest
did not attach to the collateral, any subsequent secured creditor would have a superior claim to
the property. See id. § 9-201. See also In re Platt, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 275 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa.), vacated on other grounds, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
210. The filing creditor's security interest would be unperfected. Putterbaugh v. Fournier
(In re Happy Jack's Restaurant, Inc.), 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 653, 660 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1980). Because the security interest is unperfected, it would be subordinate to the later perfected security interest in the same collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a) (1972).
211. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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that would not appear in the minimally prudent search of the records
under the debtor's name should not operate to perfect that filing creditor's security interest, nor should it be sufficient to afford priority to
that creditor's claim over the claim of a subsequently searching secured
creditor.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

2 12
The foundation of article 9 ostensibly is the notice-filing system.
If one accepts the premise that the notice filing system is the crux of
article 9, then it is appropriate to construct analyses of its operation
that enhance the integrity of the notice filing system. Permitting financing statements filed solely under the debtor's trade name to be effective
undermines that integrity.
Amendment of the U.C.C. to clarify further the requirement that
financing statements contain the debtor's legal name seems unlikely.
Nevertheless, employment of the analysis proposed in this article by
courts determining the validity of financing statements obviates the necessity of any amendment. Furthermore, it would inject a greater degree of certainty into the area of secured transactions.
Parties searching the U.C.C. records are doing so in the hopes of
not finding financing statements covering property of the debtor. The
ideal search will disclose that no financing statements are on record. At
the very least, the searcher, in a personal and manual review of the
record, must review at least two names on the index. If the debtor's
name does not appear, the searcher rightfully should conclude that no
financing statements are on record for the particular debtor. The
notice-filing system fundamentally recognizes this search purpose. The
courts should construe section 9-402(8) of the Code consistently with
this purpose and find that financing statements filed under a debtor's
trade name that would not be disclosed in a minimal and reasonable
search by a prudent searcher are insufficient to perfect a security interest in the debtor's property.

212. See generally Baird, supra note 199, at 60, 65. Professor Baird observes: "Benefits to
secured creditors may be the primary justification for the present notice-filing system." Id. at 60.
"Article 9s notice-filing system meshes perfectly with its first-to-file rule." Id. at 65.
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